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Abstract
Cryptographic and authentication applications in application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs) and field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), as well as codes for the
activation of on-chip features, require the use of embedded secret information. The
generation of secret bitstrings using physical unclonable functions, or PUFs, provides
several distinct advantages over conventional methods, including the elimination of
costly non-volatile memory, and the potential to increase the random bits available to
applications.
In this dissertation, a Hardware-Embedded Delay PUF (HELP) is proposed that is
designed to leverage path delay variations that occur in the core logic macros of a chip to
create random bitstrings. A thorough discussion is provided of the operational details of
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an embedded path timing structure called REBEL that is used by HELP to provide the
timing functionality upon which HELP relies for the entropy source for the cryptographic
quality of the bitstrings. Further details of the FPGA-based implementation used to prove
the viability of the HELP PUF concept are included, along with a discussion of the
evolution of the techniques employed in realizing the final PUF engine design.
The bitstrings produced by a set of 30 FPGA boards are evaluated with regard to
several statistical quality metrics including uniqueness, randomness, and stability. The
stability characteristics of the bitstrings are evaluated by subjecting the FPGAs to
commercial-grade temperature and power supply voltage variations. In particular, this
work evaluates the reproducibility of the bitstrings generated at 0C, 25C, and 70C, and
10% of the rated supply voltage.
A pair of error avoidance schemes are proposed and presented that provide
significant improvements to the HELP PUF's resiliency against bit-flip errors in the
bitstrings.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Recent years have seen a decline in the vertically-integrated nature of the
semiconductor industry. One effect of this change has been a heightened concern over the
issues of hardware security and trust in the VLSI design/manufacturing/distribution
cycle. Threats of such activities as the unauthorized cloning of integrated circuits and the
placement of key components in sensitive electronic systems that may have been
compromised or altered are serious, real, and difficult to thwart using only procedural and
policy methods. Additionally, the security weaknesses imposed by the storage of secret
keys and identification in non-volatile storage in an IC make these techniques
unattractive as well. As a result, the emergence of these threats is causing designers to
search for effective measures to counter the security risks that they present. One
technique that has shown promise is the physical unclonable function (PUF); the
exploitation of repeatedly random device properties to distinguish one instance of a
device from another.
PUFs enjoy a key advantage over other techniques for establishing unique
identification for individual integrated circuits, particularly over storage-based solutions
such as eFUSE and EEPROM technologies; because their uniquely identifying
characteristics derive from naturally-varying physical properties within the die, they do
not require, nor do they permit, the impression of an identification mark from the outside
world.
1

Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are becoming increasingly attractive for
generating random bitstrings for a wide range of security-related applications. PUFs are
designed to reliably differentiate one chip from another by leveraging the naturallyoccurring random process variations which occur when the chips are fabricated. Process
variations are increasing as layout geometries shrink across technology generations.
Although undesirable from a design perspective, the electrical variations introduced by
process variations define the entropy source on which PUFs are based. PUFs are designed
to measure and 'digitize' these electrical variations to create random bitstrings. The most
common sources of variations that PUFs leverage include path delay, metal resistance
and SRAM power-up patterns.
The quality of the bitstrings produced by a PUF are typically evaluated using a
suite of statistical tests. Generally, three criteria are considered essential for a PUF to be
used for applications such as encryption: 1) the bitstrings produced for each chip must be
sufficiently unique to distinguish each chip in the population, 2) the bitstrings must be
random, making them difficult for an adversary to model and predict, and 3) the bitstring
for any one chip must be stable over time and across varying environmental conditions.
In this thesis, we present a detailed examination of a PUF, called HELP, that is
based on path delay variations. The novel features that differentiate HELP from other
delay-based PUFs include: 1) the capability of comparing paths of different lengths
without adding bias, 2) elimination of specialized test structures, 3) a minimally invasive
design with low per-bit area and performance impact, and 4) a PUF engine that is
integrated into the existing functional units of the chips and requires no external testing
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resources. The integration of HELP into an existing functional unit, such as an
implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), allows it to leverage a large
source of entropy while minimizing its overall footprint. This large source of entropy
allows HELP to generate long bitstrings, while being conservative in the paths selected
for bit generation. The large availability of paths also enables unique opportunities for
avoiding bit-flip errors.
The HELP PUF introduced in this thesis presents a new concept in path delay PUFs
and includes experimental results, performance analysis against a set of established PUF
evaluation criteria, and a complete PUF primitive and an associated on-chip PUF engine.
The term “hardware-embedded” refers, in this context, to PUFs that generate repeatedly
random digital bit strings which can subsequently be supplied to encryption circuitry for
use in its functional operation. Because the chip is able, internally, both to generate and
consume the PUF bit string (e.g., as a private key for an encryption engine), the bit string
does not need to be transmitted off-chip.
HELP is based upon path delay, and takes advantage of manufacturing variations
which alter the propagation delays in a target design. By eliminating the magnitudes of
path lengths and accounting for timing and measurement uncertainties, this PUF enables
the comparison of logic paths whose actual path delays might vary widely. Because I am
not constrained to only comparing paths with similar lengths, this approach permits an
exponential number of delay comparisons, and consequently, the generation of PUF bit
strings the lengths of which grow exponentially with increasingly long challenge vectors.
Using data that was generated during prior experimentation using an on-chip path delay
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measurement structure, we examine the resulting comparisons using several standard
statistical metrics to determine the effectiveness of our PUF strategy, including analyses
of numeric distribution, Hamming distance, Euclidean distance, and tests of the
randomness of the resulting bit string.
As with all PUFs, we have found that uncertainty in our delay measurements has a
direct bearing on the amount of the variability that can be used to create separation
between devices. As a result, we have performed an analysis of the uncertainty that is
present in the data, and that information is presented here as well.
There is a growing set of advanced statistical analysis tools and techniques that are
being commonly applied to the data generated by any random or pseudo-random number
generator (RNG/PRNG); these include a battery of statistical tests from the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2]. We have included a discussion of our
ongoing work with these and other tools, such as the use of helper data and error
correction to improve the utility of PUF bit strings.
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Chapter 2: Background
The PUF first appeared as a mechanism for generating secure bitstrings in [3] and
[4]. The PUF as a chip identifier, however, was introduced earlier in [5]. Proposed PUF
designs generally fall into one of the following classifications: SRAM PUFS [6], ring
oscillators [7][8], MOS drive-current PUFs [9], delay line and arbiter PUFs [10], and
PUFs based upon variations in a chip's metal wires [11]. Delay-based PUFs also include
such designs as the Glitch PUF, which leverages variation in glitch behavior and is
presented in [12]. Each of these PUFs takes advantage of one or more naturally-varying
properties, and nearly all PUFs share a common set of challenges such as measurement
error and uncertainty, and fluctuations in voltage or temperature. The degree to which a
given PUF can tolerate or mitigate these challenges is an important indicator of its utility
for generating secret data.
The HELP PUF proposed in this dissertation, is to the best of our knowledge the
only delay-based PUF that combines the following features:
• The HELP PUF is entangled with the hardware in which it is embedded, in the sense
that the path delays measured in, e.g., an AES core logic macro, can be used to
generate a bitstring that is subsequently used as the key for use by AES in functional
mode. The proximity of the bit generation to the hardware that uses the bitstring
improves robustness against invasive or probing attacks designed to steal the key.
• The bit flip avoidance scheme proposed in this thesis significantly reduces the
probability of bit-flip errors during regeneration.
5

• The physical implementation of HELP uses standard hardware resources commonly
available in the fabric of an FPGA, including an on-chip digital clock manager
(DCM). (Note: the authors of [13] also leverage the high timing resolution provided
by a DCM for Trojan detection and IC authentication, although they did so using an
earlier version of the same FPGA. They used a Virtex-II device from Xilinx [14],
with a DCM capable of timing increments of 160 ps, while our experiments utilize a
Virtex-II Pro, which has the capability of phase adjustments of just under 80 ps when
used with a 50-MHz clock like that used in our experiments. Additionally, the
applications most directly targeted by their research were authentication and
hardware Trojan Horse (HTH) detection.)
• By using the core logic of AES itself, a large source of existing entropy is leveraged.
The area of hardware security research that is concerned with developing methods
of security based upon a device's unclonable properties can be coarsely divided into two
categories: 1) methods that make use of those properties which are purely physical in
nature, and 2) methods which rely upon those physical properties which in some way
impinge on the electrical behavior or performance of an individual component or device.
The first category, referred to in Chapter 4 of [15] as Unique Objects (UNOs),
encompasses a number of interesting and potentially viable identification methods,
including, for example, the unique scattering patterns created by light passing through, or
reflecting from, the surface of an object under consideration. However, these UNOs
typically require specialized external measurement equipment, are fundamentally
different in kind than those involving the electrical properties of electronic circuits and,
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as such, are not considered further in this work.

2.1 PUF Classification and Types
In recent years, as PUFs have gained attention in hardware security research,
developments in the field have crystallized into a handful of architectural classes. Most
proposed PUFs fall into one of several categories: so-called “bistable element PUFs”,
ring oscillators (ROs), MOS drive-current differences, and delay line and arbiter PUFs, as
well as PUFs based upon variations in back-end-of-line (BEOL) properties, such as metal
thickness and via resistance.
2.1.1 Bistable Element PUFs
2.1.1.1. SRAM/Butterfly PUFs

SRAM PUFs are based upon a traditional six-transistor static RAM cell, and make
use of the mismatched threshold voltages in small inverter transistors caused by
variations in the manufacturing process [16]. Proponents of the SRAM PUF claim that
the combined effects of common-mode process variations and common-mode
temperature and power supply fluctuations are effectively eliminated by the differential
nature of the SRAM PUF. These PUFs have less of an advantage in those devices without
SRAM cells, as an important design feature of this PUF type is the regularity and
symmetry of the layout which must be present in the cells to prevent adverse biasing
effects from degrading the performance of the PUF. A similar PUF concept, known as the
Butterfly PUF [17], is based upon two opposing NAND gates that interact in much the
same way as an SRAM cell and has been proposed for use in those designs which do not
7

use SRAM memory cells as a standard cell library component. As in the SRAM PUF, the
stable state of each Butterfly PUF cell is determined randomly by mismatches between
the threshold voltages and drive strengths of the component transistors.
This PUF is also heavily dependent upon consistent layout to eliminate bias. SRAM
PUFs and Butterfly PUFs are examples of a class known as “weak PUFs”, characterized
by a relatively small number of challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Strong PUFs, such as
those described in the upcoming paragraphs, generally are marked by a large, often
exponential, number of CRPs.
2.1.1.2. The BusKeeper PUF.

This PUF concept was proposed as an area-efficient alternative to the use of DFlipflop (DFF)-styled and traditional 6T-style SRAM PUFs.
The buskeeper, also known as a weak keeper, is a small, inputless cross-coupled
latch made from minimum- (or less-than-minimum-) sized transistors that is used to help
to preserve a bus-attached (tri-stated) register's state. The small size of the device is
designed to be easily overwritten by changes in the state of the register itself.
Beyond the savings in area and power, there is little difference between the
fundamental operation of the PUF itself and that of other bistable element PUFs. The
authors of [6] present the details of a PUF implementation using the buskeeper in a 65nm TSMC bulk technology. The analysis includes a discussion of the PUF's performance
across an industrial range of temperatures. No voltage analysis is provided, and while this
could be considered a weakness of the research, it was shown in [18] that SRAM PUFs
are, in relative terms, not significantly subject to changes in supply voltage. Given that
8

the final state of the Buskeeper PUF is also arbitrated during the power supply ramp to its
final value, it is reasonable to conclude that the Buskeeper PUF is not adversely affected
by changes in supply voltage, it would have strengthened the research to demonstrate this
immunity in the paper.
2.1.2. Delay-Based PUFs
Two examples of strong PUFs are the arbiter PUF [19] and the ring oscillator PUF
[20]. These delay-based PUFs make use of variations in device characteristics which alter
the path delays through these PUFs. These PUFs are of particular interest to the work that
I have done, as HELP is also a type of delay-based PUF.
2.1.2.1. The Arbiter PUF

The Arbiter PUF makes use of a pair of configurable, identically laid-out paths
through a set of path-switching elements, terminating at an arbitration element. In many
such designs, the arbiter is a 'D' flip-flop with one path connected to the 'D' input and the
other path driving the D-FF's clock input. A positive-going edge is asserted onto both
paths simultaneously, setting up a race condition between the propagating edges which is
determined by the random variations in the path design. In some devices, the path which
is connected to the clock input of the arbiter will be faster, and a transition will occur at
the clock input ahead of the 'D' input, and a '0' will be stored in the arbiter. In other
devices, the 'D' transition will occur ahead of the clock, and a '1' will be stored. Multiple
arbiters PUF structures, with large numbers of switching elements in each, can be
implemented to increase the number of resulting bits in the PUF bit string, and the size of
the challenge vector space is determined by the number of switching elements in each
9

PUF.
While arbiter PUFs have been demonstrated to be effective and realizable, there are
several significant drawbacks, as well: they impose heavy area and power penalties, and
they require a high degree of regularity to prevent bias. Additionally, as the length of an
arbiter PUF increases, the Central Limit Theorem dictates that the aggregate path length
tends to converge to a mean value, and there is often not sufficient difference in the path
delays to overcome the setup and hold time of the arbiter, resulting in many unstable,
unusable CRPs.
2.1.2.2. The Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF

Another delay-based PUF is the RO PUF which, as the name implies, uses a large
number of ring oscillators and pulse counters. The ROs are enabled and used to increment
counter values for a fixed period; the values in the counters are then compared and the
results of the comparisons are used to generate binary digits in the PUF bit string. This
PUF also imposes a high area cost, and in addition, the large number of oscillating
devices incurs large dynamic power consumption.
RO PUFs are used heavily in the research of PUFs because they are easily
understood and can be easily implemented in FPGA-based hardware experiments. Their
widespread adoption in commercial PUF applications could be unlikely, however, as their
high area cost and large dynamic power footprint will remain a liability throughout the
lifetime of the chip.
2.1.3. The Power Grid PUF (PG-PUF)
The PG-PUF is an example of a PUF based upon the electrical characteristics of a
10

power distribution system (PDS) such as that found in a traditional IC design. This PUF
belongs to a class of PUFs that leverage physical properties in an existing chip (as
contrasted with front-end-of-line (FEOL) variations in transistors); as such, the
performance of this PUF will depend more upon the types and magnitudes of variations
that occur in post-metal manufacturing operations. The PG- PUF relies on comparisons
between the voltage drops that occur at different points in the multi-level metal grid of a
PDS when current flow is induced at a point in the network. Process variations result in
localized changes in the resistance of the metal lines and the vias between the metal
layers. An alternate method is to combine the voltage and current measurements to
compute an equivalent resistance (REQ). Regardless of the method used, the binary
evaluations that result from these comparisons are used to create a unique digital bit
string for a given device.
Although no formal study on the impact of aging has been completed at the time of
this writing, the PG-PUF may offer a significantly reduced sensitivity to changes in PUF
response over time. This is because, unlike the classification of PUFs that draw on
variations in the front-end-of-line (FEOL) processes that produce the transistor devices,
the only significant aging effect related to the entropy source upon which the PUF draws
is electromigration, the physical displacement of metal molecules caused by extremely
localized areas of high current (such as in corners and jogs in the metal lines). The
temperature effects related the FEOL, in contrast, will be related more to the readout
circuitry, and therefore appear as common-mode changes that affect the individual
measurements equally. (Note: the author concedes that this is assertion amounts to little
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more than informed speculation.)

2.2. PUF Design – Challenges
Each of the PUFs that have been proposed or implemented attempts to leverage one
or more naturally varying properties. These PUFs share, to varying degrees, the
challenges that arise from a number of sensitivities, including measurement error and
uncertainty, fluctuations in process, voltage, or temperature (PVT) conditions, and
instability over time [21], among other factors. Devising methods and techniques for the
mitigation of these sensitivities is equally as important to the development of robust and
reliable PUFs as the underlying PUF design itself. Regardless of the type of PUF that is
considered, the ability to attain perfection in terms of robustness and randomness remains
an elusive goal. As a result, some PUF designers have come to rely on the use of “helper
data”, which is information concerning the PUF bit string that is made externally
available to help to identify those bits that are not stable enough to be included in a PUF
bit string. This information, however, “leaks” or reduces the amount of entropy that a
PUF can leverage. As such, one desirable characteristic of a robust PUF is the avoidance
of the need to rely on the use of helper data.
One technique for improving PUF performance without the need for helper data is
the use of hardware redundancy to create a voting scheme, which reduces the probability
of single-bit instability in a PUF bit string. This technique necessarily incurs a penalty in
terms of area and power consumption, while maximizing the use of available entropy in
the PUF design.
The HELP PUF is, to the best of my knowledge, the only delay-based PUF that
12

offers the following combination of characteristics; it is hardware-entangled, which
means that 'secret' information is derived from the core-logic components themselves and
therefore secrets remain localized on-chip to those components that use that information,
it takes advantage of an existing REBEL path-delay measurement structure (discussed
thoroughly in the following chapter), and it is 'all-digital', which means that it can be
implemented using standard library components, i.e., there is no need for a specialized
on-chip PUF structure outside of the PUF engine that controls its operation.

13

Chapter 3: The Hardware-Embedded Delay PUF

The Hardware-Embedded Delay PUF, or HELP, is a physical unclonable function
that draws on the variations in path delay found in an existing combinational logic block.
The actual path delay measurements are carried out by an embedded test structure called
REBEL [22]. This test structure was developed primarily for adding the ability to do onchip path delay timing measurements in Design-For-Testability (DFT) applications, but
which offers a convenient mechanism for providing path timing functionality for the
HELP PUF as well. The REBEL embedded timing structure is discussed in greater detail
in the following chapter.

14

Chapter 4: REBEL Test Structure

In [22], we proposed an embedded test structure (ETS), called REBEL, which is
designed to measure regional path delays in macros while minimizing these types of
adverse effects. This test structure is designed to serve applications such as model-to-

Fig. 1: REBEL Implementation Strategy
hardware correlation, detection of hardware Trojans [13], design debug processes,
detection of small delay defects [23], and, especially relevant for this work, physical
unclonable functions. Each of these areas requires accurate measurements of path delays
and/or the ability to differentiate at high resolutions between delays of neighboring paths.
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The REBEL ETS leverages the scan chain architecture to measure delay variations;
in particular, it uses a special configuration of flush delay mode that is available in levelsensitive scan design (LSSD) scan chains and in modified Mux-D scan designs. We
demonstrated in a previous work [24] the promise of capturing regional delay variations
using a special launch-capture timing sequence applied while in flush delay mode. We
extend this technique here by allowing output signals from design macros to be inserted
into the flush delay chain for path delay measurements.

4.1. REBEL for LSSD Scan
As indicated previously, REBEL is integrated into the scan chain directly, as shown
in Fig. 2 for a clocked-LSSD-style scan architecture. Here, the regions labeled ‘Product

Fig. 2: REBEL Row Control Logic (RCL)
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Macro’ are functional units composed of combinational logic. Three scan chain segments
are shown that serve to deliver input and capture output from these macros. The three
blocks labeled Row Control Logic identify components of the REBEL ETS, and are
described below. Beyond these three ‘header’ blocks, smaller blocks are also needed for
local scan signal control for each of the scan FFs. The basic idea is to generate a
transition on the inputs to the macro using a standard launch-off-capture transition fault
test. In this scenario, the scan chain is loaded with the initial pattern of the 2-pattern test
and the system clock (CLK) is used to generate a transition in the core logic by capturing
the output of a previous block, or by capturing the PI values, as shown in the figure. One
or more transitions are propagated through the macro, as shown by the dotted line labeled
“PUT” (for “path-under-test”). The PUT’s transition emerges on an output of the macro,
and drives the D input of a scan FF in the second row. Special control logic associated
with the scan FF (to be described) allows the transition to propagate along the scan chain,
as shown by the dotted line in Fig. 2. CLK is then reasserted to halt the propagation,
which effectively ‘takes a digital snapshot’ of the signal propagation behavior along the
scan chain, including any glitching that may have occurred. This digital snapshot is then
scanned out for analysis.
For designs that make use of LSSD-style scan, propagation along the scan chain is
relatively straightforward to implement. This is true because LSSD inherently supports a
flush-delay (FD) mode of operation. In FD mode, both the 'Scan A' clock (SCA) and
'Scan B' clock (SCB) are held high, effectively making both latches of the FF transparent,
i.e., any transition generated on D propagates to Q after a ∆t that represents the delay
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through the FF. FD mode effectively makes the scan chain a combinational inverter
chain.
However, the configuration in Fig. 2 differs from the traditional definition of FD
mode because only a portion of the scan chain is configured in FD mode. In particular,
the scan FFs along the top row and those along the middle row to the point of insertion of
the PUT operate in functional mode, and only those to the right (and below) of this point
operate in FD mode. In order to realize this configuration, several changes are required to
the logic implementing the scan operation.
One of the components to support this dual mode of operation is labeled Row
Control Logic (RCL) on the left side of Fig. 2. These blocks, in combination with a scan
chain encoding scheme and localized scan FF logic, enable this dual mode of operation
and provide a mechanism to specify a PUT’s output to direct into the scan chain. This is
accomplished by configuring several state bits in the RCL, and by loading a specific
pattern into the scan chain before the launch-capture (LC) timing sequence (REBEL test)
is applied, as described below.
Each RCL block controls a ‘row’ of scan FFs, called row-FFs, in the following
description. Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of the RCL. The top portion of the
diagram controls local (row-specific) scan clock signals, labeled SCA_L and SCB_L (_L
for local) while the bottom portion contains two shift registers (Shift Reg) and mode
select logic. A large portion of the RCL logic is in place to allow different sections of the
row FFs to operate in either of the traditional functional or scan modes of operation. The
global (chip-wide) scan signals (labeled ‘global SCA’ and ‘global SCB’) are used to
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specify one of the three possible global operational states. When both are low, the entire
row is set to operate in functional mode, with CLK controlling the launch-capture activity
in the row FFs. Non-overlapping assertion of these signals causes all scan FFs to act as a

Fig. 3: REBEL Cell Modification Logic (LSSD)
shift register, implementing scan mode. The timing mode used by REBEL is specified
when both of these signals are asserted. This is illustrated by the ‘1’s on global SCA and
SCB in Fig. 2.
Note that the two shift registers in the RCL block are conditionally inserted into the
scan chain during a scan operation and can therefore be configured prior to a REBEL test.
The shift registers’ scan clock inputs (SCA/SCB) are also gated to prevent them from
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entering FD mode, thereby destroying the state information, when both global SCA and
SCB signals are asserted. The state of the two shift registers defines the mode of
operation for the row when REBEL mode is activated. Two control bits (as opposed to
one) are needed to implement the simultaneous functional and FD modes discussed above
because there are actually four possible conditions that need to be handled. The three
rows of scan FFs in Fig. 1 illustrate three of the four conditions. For example, the scan
FFs in the top row need to be in functional mode throughout the REBEL test. In contrast,
the scan FFs in the bottom row need to be in FD mode to extend the propagation path of
the PUT signal captured in the middle row. Finally, the middle row contains scan FFs in
both of these modes, i.e., the scan FFs to the left of the PUT insertion point are in
function mode while those to the right are in FD mode. The fourth condition is just a
special case of this third condition where the insertion point is the left-most scan FF in
the row. Table 1 identifies the bit configurations that handle these four conditions.
RCL Shift Reg

Functionality

00

All scan FFs in Row are in functional mode

01

All scan FFs in row are in FD mode

11/10

Left scan FFs in functional mode, right scan FFs in FD mode
(10: Insertion Point is leftmost scan FF)

Table 1: Configuration States for Row Control Logic
Before describing the annotations in Fig. 4, we turn to the configuration of the scan
FFs. Fig. 4(a) shows a clocked LSSD FF (CLSSD), which consists of three latches. The
two latches on the left implement the functional path, and are controlled by the system
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clock (Clk). The center latch is dually ported and serves both as the slave for the
functional path and as the master in the LSSD pair. The right-most latch is the slave latch
of the LSSD pair. The top pass-gate of the dual port latch is highlighted to indicate that it
has been modified. In the following paragraphs, it will become apparent that during the
REBEL test, both CLK and SCA will be asserted simultaneously during a portion of the
test. This creates a potential shorting condition in the dual port latch, i.e., both the master
of the functional path and the SI input paths are enabled. To prevent this from happening,
we modified the single input pass gate connected to the master’s output to include a
second input. The second input contains a “wired-AND” configuration, and prevents the
master’s output from driving the dual port latch when both CLK and SCA are asserted
simultaneously.
Fig. 4(b) shows the additional logic required to integrate REBEL into a design with
CLSSD-style scan. The functional path’s D-input is fanned out to a 2-to-1 MUX. This
will allow for the insertion of a macro’s PUT into the scan chain during the REBEL test.
The local scan signals (SCA_L and SCB_L) are gated by mode select logic shown along
the bottom of the figure. The mode select logic incorporates the normal scan path
(SOPrev to the SI input), as well as a propagating mode bit (ModePrev to ModeNext).
The mode select logic is responsible for selecting the insertion point. This is
accomplished by preloading the row-FFs with a pattern of all ‘1’s followed by a ‘0’ from
left to right along the row-FFs. The ‘0’ in this sequence causes the next scan FF to be
configured in a special way, i.e., it allows the PUF output signal to drive the SI pin. The
annotation and dotted line in the figure illustrates this case, and assumes the scan FF on
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the left (not shown) is configured with a ‘0’ bit. Given the scan chain connects the SO
output of each scan FF to the SOPrev of the next scan FF, this arrangement allows the
scan chain encoding to specify the PUT insertion point. Moreover, the split mode of
operation required for this row is implemented using a propagating mode bit (ModePrev
and ModeNext), which is ‘1’ for all scan FFs to the left of the insertion point and ‘0’ to
the right. The left-most scan FFs in the middle row of Fig. 1 are annotated with a bit
configuration that enables the insertion of the PUT at the position shown.
The mode select logic also participates in controlling the local scan signals (SCA_L
and SCB_L), and completes the implementing of the four conditions described above in
reference to the RCL. The shift registers in Fig. 2 are annotated with four states (for the
four conditions). The ‘00’ state, which forces functional mode for the row-FFs (row 1 in
Fig. 1), sets both SCA_L and SCB_L to ‘1’. Given that these signal connect to the inputs
of the two NOR gates in instances of the scan FFs (as shown in Fig. 4(b)), and ‘1’ is the
dominate value for a NOR gate, this condition effectively disables FD mode for the entire
row. In this case, the ModeNext and SONext output signals of the RCL, which connect to
the left-most scan FF’s ModePrev and SOPrev signals, are irrelevant.
The ‘01’ state, as discussed earlier, forces the row-FFs into FD mode (row 3 in Fig.
1). This requires both of the SCA_L and SCB_L signals to be set to ‘0’. However, the
annotation in Fig. 2 indicates that the value of SCA_L is ‘Q’, which is the inverted output
value of the negative-edge-triggered FF (N-FF) in the RCL. In the implementation flow
for a REBEL test, the initial value of the N-FF is set to ‘1’ by virtue of strobing the
SET_B signal low prior to the REBEL test. The REBEL test is defined as a rising edge on
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CLK (which effectively launches a transition(s) into the macro-under- test), followed by a
falling edge on CLK that acts to capture a snapshot of the PUT’s behavior in the scan
chain. The snapshot is realized by deasserting the Q output of the N-FF, which occurs
when CLK goes low. This in turn causes the SCA_L output signal from the RCL to
transition from ‘0’ (initial value) to ‘1’. From Fig. 4(b), the arrival of the ‘1’ on SCA_L
signals of the scan FFs deasserts the SCA input and turns off FD mode. This action
captures the snapshot of the PUT’s voltage behavior in the scan chain.
The ModeNext output signal of the RCL configured in the ‘01’ state is ‘0’. The ‘0’
propagates along the mode select logic of the row and forces all row FFs to operate in
scan mode, i.e., SO to SI to SO, and so on. This condition allows for the propagation of
the PUT’s signal along the scan chain. The SONext signal’s value for state ‘01’ is given
as ‘SI’ to indicate that this signal is driven from the SI input of the RCL. Therefore, the
scan chain bypasses (and preserves the contents of) the state elements in the RCL. The SI
input in turn connects to the SO signal from the right-most scan FF of the previous row,
effectively extending the scan path across rows (see Fig. 1).
Finally, the ‘11’ state in the RCL configures a split mode of operation in the row
FFs and connects a specific PUT output into the scan chain (row 2 in Fig. 1). The mode
select logic in the scan FFs work together with the RCL block to implement this split
mode of operation. The behavior of the SCA_L and SCB_L outputs are identical to those
described above for state ‘01’. The difference lies in the state of the ModeNext and
SONext output signals in Fig. 2. As noted above, a string of ‘1’s followed by a ‘0’ are
preloaded into the scan chain to specify the PUT insertion point. The ‘1’ on the
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ModeNext output propagates along the mode select logic, described earlier in reference
to Fig. 4(b) until a ‘0’ is encountered in scan FFs of the row. This causes the next scan FF
to be configured as the insertion point. The remaining scan FFs in the row are configured
in FD mode because the mode bit is inverted to a ‘0’ after the insertion point. RCL state
‘10’ behaves identically but allows the insertion point to be the left-most scan FF in the
row.
We have designed the REBEL support logic such that it minimizes the impact on
the functional behavior of the design. There are two components of REBEL that impact
the functional operation. The first is the change of the CLSSD as shown in Fig. 4(a), and
the second is the fanout of the D input to the 2-to-1 MUX as shown in Fig. 4(b). Each of
these changes adds a small delay (∆t) to the functional path.

4.2. REBEL For Mux-D-Style Scan
Although we integrate and demonstrate REBEL in a CLSSD- style scan chain
(which is the style used in the design flow of our 90-nm test chip), MUX scan is the
industry standard and is the design generally required for FPGA-based implementations
such as has been used for the majority of this research. Integration of REBEL into MUX
scan is easy and even less invasive than it is for CLSSD. The overall operation of REBEL
for MUX scan is very similar to that described for CLSSD. The main difference is that
the launch and capture is accomplished using rising edges of CLK (as opposed to a rising
and falling edge for CLSSD). Also, an additional primary input is required to specify FD
mode. This global signal is routed to the RCL blocks (not shown). A RCL block for MUX
scan is similar in function to the CLSSD version except that all logic in reference to
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Fig. 4: REBEL Support Logic for MUX Scan
SCA_L and SCB_L of Fig. 2 can be eliminated. The key objective in the MUX scan
implementation is to implement a FD mode, i.e., a combinational path, using the latches
within the MUX scan FFs. This can be achieved by adding a ‘tappoint’ to the master
latch, called QMNext in Fig. 4, and routing this signal to a 2-to-1 MUX in the next scan
FF of the scan path (labeled QMPrev in Fig. 4). The SE input in Fig. 4 refers to the
globally routed scan enable signal (already required for MUX scan). SE is set to ‘1’ when
we are in scan mode, and ‘0’ when in functional or FD (REBEL test) mode. The
remaining logic gates are inserted to implement the four conditions described earlier.
For example, to configure a row in functional mode (row 1 in Fig. 1), the RCL
block places a ‘0’ on the FD_L wire. To configure a row in FD mode (row 3 in Fig. 1),
the RCL block sets FD_L to ‘1’ and ModePrev to ‘0’. For a split mode row (row 2 in Fig.
1), the same scan FF encoding method described for CLSSD is used. In addition, the
RCL block forces a ‘1’ onto FD_L and sets ModePrev to a ‘1’ for insertion points other
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than the left-most scan FF in the row or ‘0’ otherwise. The annotation in Fig. 4 shows the
values of the scan FF at the point of PUT insertion for a split mode row. The REBEL
implementation using MUX scan is actually smaller in overhead and is less invasive to
the functional path (only one capacitive load is added at the tap-point in the master latch)
than it is for CLSSD.

4.3. PUT Delay Analysis Process
The Launch/Capture delay in REBEL is controlled by CLK, as described earlier,
and therefore REBEL leverages the CLK tree for critical timing events.
A REBEL test is carried out as follows:
1. Configuration data is scanned in.
2. The global SCA and SCB signals are asserted.
3. CLK is asserted to launch a transition into the PUT.
4. CLK is deasserted after a specific ∆t, sufficiently long to allow the transitions on
the PUT to propagate along the scan chain.
5. The global SCA/SCB signals are deasserted, and the values in the scan chain are
scanned out.
The delay in the combinational path is computed using Eq. 1.
TPATH = TLC - TSC
where:
TPATH = Delay in the combinational path
TLC = Launch/Capture Delay
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Eq. 1

TSC = Delay in the Scan Chain
The scan chain delay, TSC, can be calculated from the number of scan cells that are
set by the propagating edge(s), and the data obtained from a set of calibration tests1.

1 The calibration of the scan chain propagation delay is straightforward and performed
by performing repeated timing tests with successively longer Launch/Capture
intervals, recording the intervals in which a transition reaches each FF in turn.
However, for the purposes of the HELP PUF, this calibration is not required; in this
case, we are only concerned with the interval required to propagate to a known point
in the scan chain, and not with the actual delay of a path in the MUT (as we would be
for a DFT application).
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Chapter 5: Preliminary HELP PUF Research
As noted in Chapter 4, two of the potential applications envisioned for the REBEL
ETS at the time of its design were for measuring process variability and as the basis for a
delay-based PUF design. If the REBEL embedded test structure could be used to
determine the amount of process variations in a semiconductor manufacturing process,
then it could also be used to measure those variations, store them temporarily in memory,
and use those measurements as the basis of comparisons for generating a unique bitstring
for an individual chip.
The initial investigation of the REBEL structure as a the basis for a PUF was
conducted as a series of tests on two sets of path delay data collected during REBEL
testing. The first testing of REBEL was done on an FPGA implementation of a stack of
three SBOX macros taken from an AES implementation. The design, including the
REBEL functionality, was configured in a Xilinx Virtex2-Pro FPGA, while the testing
resources, including the scan pattern generation, the clocking for the launch and capture
edges, and all of the control logic was provided from off-board by an Inovys Ocelot
structural DFT tester. A high-performance differential clock signal was provided by the
tester; however, the launch and capture clock signals consisted of consecutive rising
edges on the same clocking resource. This contrasts with the separate DCM outputs that
are used on the FPGA version of the HELP PUF engine discussed in the following
chapter.
The early experimentation with the HELP PUF concept was all done using software
28

manipulations of the scan patterns acquired during the REBEL testing of the design.
Nonetheless, the concept appeared to be successful in its primary mission of extracting a
meaningful amount of entropy from the same path timing measurements across a set of
the FPGA boards. The performance of the PUF was somewhat limited by the excessive
jitter introduced by the differential clock on the tester. Also, the limitations of the offchip analysis, in terms of the amount of data required to prove even a small amount of
entropy, soon made it apparent that a specially designed PUF engine on an FPGA was
needed to further advance the study.

29

Chapter 6: FPGA-based HELP PUF Engine
To prove the concept of the HELP PUF introduced in Chapter 3, and to conduct
research studies on its performance, we have designed and implemented a complete, selfcontained, fully functional FPGA-based HELP engine. The design for the PUF engine
was written in VHDL and the engine was created using the ISE design suite from Xilinx
Corporation[14].
The target FPGA platform was the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro device (P/N: XC2VP30).
The development board that we used for our experimentation was an XUP V2-Pro board
from Digilent, Inc. [25]. We chose this development board because we had access to 30
of these boards, which provided a sufficient population size to allow us to conduct
meaningful statistical evaluations of the PUF's performance. In addition, this board is
equipped with jumpers that can be removed to disable the on-board voltage regulator that
supplies the 1.5V internal logic voltage (VccINT) for the FPGA, and screw terminals that
facilitate the use of a programmable power supply for controlling Vcc INT
programmatically. Finally, the layout of the XUP V2-Pro board allows for placement of a
heat pump directly on the surface of the Virtex-II Pro for automated control of the chip
temperature. These features make this platform ideal for conducting environmental
testing across a range of temperatures and voltages. We provide additional details of our
environmental testing regimen later in this chapter.
The overarching design goals of the HELP PUF engine were to create and
demonstrate a hardware security primitive that: 1) used the REBEL path delay
30

Fig. 5: HELP Experimental Test Setup
measurement structure presented in Chapter 4, 2) could be added to an existing block of
combinational logic, and 3) was capable of generating cryptographic-quality bitstrings
the length of which is subject only to available on-chip block RAM (BRAM) memory.
Based upon our experimental results and the results of our randomness testing, we
believe that we have successfully met and exceeded each of these design goals with this
implementation. A photo of the XUP board and the test apparatus is shown in Fig. 5.
The HELP PUF design is comprised of several component parts. We start by
augmenting the existing logic design with the REBEL test structure, and adding several
memories, clocking circuitry, random sequence generators, stability analysis components,
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Fig. 6: HELP Structural Block Diagram
and functionality for reliably generating or regenerating the bitstring.
The operation of the HELP PUF (shown in block diagram form in Fig. 6) is divided
into two distinct phases. In the first phase, a Data Collection Engine phase, the
propagation delays of paths in the MUT are measured, digitized into integer values that
represent the path delay, analyzed for stability, and recorded in memory. The second
phase of operation is the Bit Generation phase, in which the path delays stored in memory
are compared with each other to generate a sequence of binary comparison results in the
form of a bitstring. The user requests a bitstring of a specific length, and the data
collection process continues until a sufficient number of paths have been tested to allow
the Bit Generation process to create a bitstring of the desired length.
The remaining sections of this chapter describe the subparts of the HELP PUF
engine and their operation.
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6.1. Macro-Under-Test
The macro-under-test, or MUT, used in our implementation is the logic defining a
single round of a pipelined Advanced Encryption Standard, or AES [1], implementation
from OpenCores.org [26]. Other AES implementation choices in the public domain
included non-pipelined, recirculatory designs in which the same hardware is reused for
each round2. We chose this pipelined implementation because its non-recursive datapath
design provided a more stable platform on which to test our PUF concept, and avoids the
complicating effects on path timing that are introduced by routing outputs of the macro
back into the inputs.
Space limitations on the Virtex-II Pro prevented inclusion of all 10 rounds 2 of a full
AES implementation. The block labeled 'Initial Launch Vector (256)' represents the
pipeline FFs in the full-blown AES implementation, converted here to MUX-D scan-FFs.
A second copy of this block, labeled 'Final Launch Vector (256)', is added to emulate the
logic from the omitted previous round. In our implementation, two randomly generated
vectors that represent the challenge are scan-loaded into the two blocks.
The original design of the AES core included the logic for ten pipelined rounds, and
each round was itself divided into three pipelined stages (addkey, sbox, and colmix). This
design is intended as a high-capacity, high-throughput standalone AES engine, capable of
encrypting/decrypting as many as 30 128-bit datablocks at a time. A full implementation
of this design requires an FPGA with a rather large number of sequential resources to
2 The encryption algorithm defined in the AES standard [1] operates on 128-bit data
blocks, and allows for three different key lengths (128-bit, 192-bit, and 256-bit). The
number of rounds corresponding to these key lengths is 10, 12, and 14, respectively.
The underlying algorithm is identical for all key lengths.
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support this level of pipelining, and was not suitable for our purposes. For our HELP PUF
engine, we chose to isolate a single round, and to eliminate the sequential elements
(registers) within the round, resulting in only combinational logic with a row of registers
at the output of the block. We replaced the FFs in these registers with REBEL FFs, which
are described in Chapter 4. In addition, we added two 256-element rows of FFs on the
input of the MUT which contain the initial and final vectors in a launch-capture test.

6.2. Data Collection Engine (DCE)
The DCE in Fig. 6 carries out a sequence of LC tests, measures the path delays, and
records the digitized representation of them, called PUF numbers or PNs, in block RAM
on the FPGA. In our current implementation, the DCE runs to completion before the BGE
component is started3.
6.2.1. Clock Generator
The clock generator module generates two clock signals: a Launch clock and a
Capture clock, and is shown on the left in Fig. 6. In our design, this module contains
three digital clock managers, or DCMs. A 'master' DCM is used to reduce the off-chip
oscillator-generated 100 MHz clock to 50 MHz. The output of the master DCM drives the
Launch and Capture DCMs. We utilize the fine phase adjustment (FPA) feature of the
Capture DCM to 'tune' the phase relationship between the Launch and Capture clocks. At
50 MHz, the FPA allows 80 ps increments/decrements in the phase shift of the Capture
3 While not addressed in this dissertation, the potential modification of the HELP engine
to allow the data collection and the bit generation engines to operate simultaneously
would offer two advantages: a reduction in the time required to perform a HELP PUF
operation, and a means by which to obfuscate the individual operations that would be
subject to targeting in a differential power analysis attack by an adversary.
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clock on the Virtex-II Pro chips.
When the DCE is configuring the scan chains in preparation for the LC test, the
phase relationship between the Launch and Capture clocks is eliminated without an
adjustment to the phase of the Capture clock by using an FPGA primitive called a
BUFGMUX, which allows the Launch clock to be routed to the clock inputs of the
REBEL row for the shift operation. Prior to the launch event, the controlling state
machine selects the 180° phase-shifted output of the Capture DCM, and the FPA feature
is used to tune the phase in an iterative process designed to meet a specific goal (to be
discussed).
TABLE I. CAPTURE

Phase Adj.

CLOCK PHASE ADJUSTMENT

Phase Angle

LC Interval

0

90°

5 ns

64

180°

10 ns

128

270°

15 ns

TABLE I. summarizes the characteristics of the Capture clock, and Fig. 7 illustrates
the timing relationship between the Launch and Capture clocks for different values of the
'Phase Adj.' control counter in the DCM. The launch and capture events occur on the
0

64
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Fine Phase
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Start Signal
(Asynchronous)
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of

the

corresponding clocks. From the
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timing diagram, this allows

Launch Clock
Tlc_min =5 ns

path delays from 5 ns to 15 ns

Capture Clock
(fpa=0)
Capture Clock
(fpa=64)
Capture Clock
(fpa=128)

in length to be measured. The 0

Tlc=10 ns

to 128 range of values (called
Tlc_max =15 ns

PUF numbers, or PNs) act as a

Fig. 7: Launch/Capture Timing Diagram
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digital representation of the path delays.
6.2.2. PN Memory
The PN Memory is a block RAM used to store the PNs. The size of this memory
block can be made as large or as small as required to efficiently store the PNs required to
generate a bitstring of a given size; however, the data width must be 8 bits, as the possible
Launch-Capture interval values spans the range of 0 to 128, inclusive.
6.2.3. LC LFSR Controller
The bit sequences that represent the challenges in the traditional language of PUF
research, and that are shifted into the Initial Launch Vector and Final Launch Vector scan
rows of the MUT, are generated by a 32-bit linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
contained in the LC LFSR controller. An additional register and control signals are
manipulated by a finite state machine (FSM) to cause the LC LFSR to be operated in one
of three modes. The first mode initializes the LC LFSR to a seed value provided as a
parameter by the HELP PUF user. Another mode stores the current value in the temporary
seed register and permits the LC LFSR controller to repeatedly issue the same 512-bit
launch vectors for repeated testing across multiple samples and across multiple insertion
points (see Chapter 4). Finally, a third mode retains the present LC LFSR contents,
effectively advancing the LC LFSR to the next 512-bit subsequence, based upon the
LFSR configuration.
6.2.4. REBEL Controller
The REBEL controller, while not part of the REBEL design, is used by the DCE to
configure the IP in the REBEL row attached to the output of the AES logic block in
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advance of each launch-capture interval of each sample of each LC Test (path timing)
sequence.
6.2.5. Sample Analysis Engine (SAE)
This FSM analyzes the digitized results in the delay chain after each LC test for a
given path and determines whether the path is 'valid'. A valid path is defined as one that
has a real transition, is glitch-free, and produces consistent results across multiple
samples. If a PN is deemed to be stable, the PN is stored in memory, and a “valid path”
flag is set in the Valid Path Memory (see below) corresponding to that path name.
6.2.6. Valid Path Memory
A block RAM is used to record a pass/fail flag for each tested path that reflects its
validity (as defined by the criteria for the SAE). These flags are set/cleared during
enrollment and then played back from non-volatile or off-chip memory (public storage)
during regeneration, and represent the helper data needed in the regeneration process.

6.3. Bit Generation Engine
The Bit Generation Engine is comprised of a collection of hardware components
and state machines that support the use of the PNs stored in PN memory to create the
bitstrings. Included in the Bit Generation Engine are an LFSR-based pseudorandom
pairings generator that randomizes the order in which PNs are read from memory, a block
of BRAM that is used to store public data (in addition to the Valid Path Memory in the
DCE) for properly recreating the bitstring during regeneration, and finally, the BRAM
which contains the final bitstring.
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Chapter 7: Bit Generation Techniques
The ultimate objective of the HELP PUF is the creation of bitstrings that can be
used for any of a number of purposes, ranging from cryptographic keys to chip
identification and authentication to hardware support for random number generation. As
stated in the introduction of this dissertation, the quality of the bitstring that the HELP
PUF produces is dependent upon several performance metrics, such as uniqueness,
repeatability, randomness, and efficiency.
To accomplish this aim, several techniques for generating bitstrings were created
and implemented. This section of the thesis provides a detailed examination of those
techniques, and a comparative analysis of the strengths and challenges of each.

7.1. Modulus
The genesis of the HELP PUF began with the germ of an idea – that the variation in
path delays present in an existing functional logic macro could provide the foundation for
a PUF. However, attempts to capitalize on this phenomenon soon presented a number of
challenges. The first issue that was clearly evident was that, unlike other delay-based
PUFs such as the RO PUF or the Arbiter PUF, path delays in a macro are not specially
designed to be all the same, and in any such logic macro, the presence of a large gross
difference between any two path lengths would result in a bias that would overshadow
any amount of process variation for that comparison, rendering the comparison unusable
since all instances would result in the same evaluation.
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At the other extreme,

environmental and measurement noise effects would necessarily result in some variation
being non-repeatable, unstable, and therefore unusable.
To address these issues, the path delay measurements came to be characterized as
being comprised of three distinct components. First, the bulk of the propagation delay in
a given path is not subject to vary from one chip instance to another. A path in one chip
that is, for example, 10 ns is not likely to be measured at, say, 15 ns in another chip. As a
result, this path delay component represents a constant term, and in a digitized, quantized
representation of this delay, this component will appear in the most significant bits
(MSBs) of the digitized value. The second component of any path delay measurement
will include the noise, or uncertainty (resulting from measurement noise, thermal or
voltage fluctuations, quantization errors, etc.), and will be found in the least significant
bits (LSBs) of a digitized delay value. The third component of delay measurement is the
variation in the signal (resulting from process variations that occur during the chip's
manufacture). This variation is found in the bits of a quantized value that are constant
across repeated measurements and changing environmental conditions for the same
device, but that are found to be different between the same paths on different chips.
It was theorized that it may be possible to make use of the digitized representation
of a pair of path delays to allow the direct comparison of the variability of any two paths,
regardless of their path length. To do this, we examined a large number of paths and
determined, empirically, the magnitude of the uncertainty across a series of repetitive
measurements of the same path on the same chip. We then compared the delay values of
the same path on several chips to acquire a sense of the magnitude of the variability
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Fig. 8: Modulus-Based Path Delay Comparison (deprecated)
found in the population. The example in Fig. 8 illustrates this technique, and shows how
the digitized value can be apportioned into a single set of bits (shown in green in the
digitized values of the figure) that represent the variations between chips. In the example,
the uncertainty was found to be < 200 ps, and the variations as high as 3.2 ns (2 4, or 16
200-ps intervals). The upper bits in the values represented the gross path length, and were
discarded, along with the 4 LSBs that contained the uncertainty (noise).
Ultimately, this technique, while initially promising, was found to be unworkable
due to non-uniformity in the distribution of the variations among the 16 values
represented by the 4 bits. Additionally, as shown in Fig. 9, the noise was largely
determined to be less than 200 ps; however, the outliers that are evident show occasional
uncertainty of as much as 1.8 ns. As a result, the Modulus technique was ultimately set
aside in favor of more robust methods described below.

7.2. Dual P/N (DPN) Path Delay Binning Method.
With the failure of the Modulus method to reliably generate unique bitstrings,
another similar method was explored in which the modulus was not specifically required
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to be a power of two (so as to be described by a specific number of bits), but rather an
integer value, derived empirically, that more closely approximates the amount of true
process variation found across the population of chips. The drawing in Fig. 10 on page 42
illustrates this concept. Using this technique, a modulus operation is applied to the PUF
numbers returned by the Data Collection Engine. The resulting values, referred to as
Mod-PNs, fall into the range of [0..M-1], where M is the empirically derived modulus
number, which includes both the variation and the noise components described earlier,
while removing the bulk of the path length. This results in the ability to directly compare
paths whose lengths may be vastly different (such as the 7.8 ns path and the 23.8 ns path
in Fig. 8) without the bias that would normally preclude such a measurement.
The original intent of developing this technique was to then evaluate pairs of Mod-

Fig. 9: Results of Uncertainty (Noise) Analysis
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Fig. 10: Dual-PN Path Binning Method
PNs, using an XOR-style comparison, and generate a '0' if the Mod-PNs were from the
same “group”, and generate a '1' if they differed. However, this technique alone was
found to be insufficiently robust to accommodate the uncertainty present in the data.
Additionally, the occurrence of jumps in path delay presents an intractable hurdle for
making this technique sufficiently reliable to be the basis of a bit generation technique.
However, the DPN method has proved to be an effective means of binning the
distribution of path delays for the MUT into a binary pair of groups that subsequently
form the basis of a more robust bit generation technique. What is required is a means of
providing hardware-based error tolerance for those relatively infrequent cases where a
PN measured during regeneration is incorrectly partitioned, due to jumps or other factors.

7.3. The Dual-PN Count (DPNC) Bit Generation Method
Most PUF are designed using identical circuit primitives as a means of avoiding
bias. This is not the case for HELP, because the PUTs vary widely in length. We
developed a technique called 'Dual-PN Count' which post-processes the PNs to eliminate
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this bias. The technique applies a modulus operation to the PNs, which 'trims off' the
higher order bits of the path delay measurement. The truncation of the PNs effectively
reduces all path delays to a range upper-bounded by the modulus, i.e., it reduces the
overall path length to a range more closely consistent with the degree of variations found
in the data and allows unbiased comparisons to be made among all paths. The trimmed
Mod-PNs are then partitioned into two groups for bit generation purposes.
The diagram in Fig. 10 provides a graphical depiction of this two-step process. The
process begins on the left using a PUT with a delay between 5 ns and 15 ns. The
measured PN for this PUT is originally in the range 0 to 128, but the modulus operation
reduces it to a number in the range of 0 to M-1 (where M is a user-specified modulus).
The right-most portion of the diagram in Fig. 10 shows the partitioning of the Mod-PNs
into two groups, where values in the range of 0 to M/2-1 are placed in the low PN group,
while Mod-PNs in the range of M/2 to M-1 comprise the high PN group. Noise in the
measurements is dealt with by discarding additional PNs (beyond those discarded
because of path stability problems as described in a previous section of this thesis). In
particular, Mod-PNs that fall into regions outside those delineated in the center portion of
Fig. 10 are considered invalid during enrollment. This allows valid PNs, i.e., those that
fall within the center portions, to 'shift' during regeneration by up to M/4 in either
direction before causing a bit flip. Therefore, this scheme both eliminates bias and adds
bit flip resilience to HELP.
7.3.1. Bit Generation using DPNC
The filtering operations described above are sufficient to eliminate the adverse
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effects on delay introduced by noise and TV variations. However, large changes in the
Mod-PNs introduced by “jumps”, as described in Chapter 8, require a more resilient
technique. The rare nature of “jumps” makes it possible to develop a bit-flip avoidance
method that imposes a low area and time overhead. The 'Count' term in DPNC refers to
this feature of the method, and characterizes the process used to generate bits, which is
described as follows. During enrollment, DPNC parses the valid PNs until it encounters a
sequence of k consecutive values from the same group, where k is an odd-numbered,
user-specified threshold. Two counters track the length of a sequence of PNs from the
same group. As each PN is read, the counter for the corresponding group is incremented,
while the other group's counter is reset to 0. When either of the counters reaches k
(indicating that the k most recent PNs belong to the same group), a new bit is generated
and added to the bitstring, and a 'stop point' flag is set in the Stop Point Memory to
indicate that a bit was generated at this point. The value of the generated bit is a '1' if the
PNs are from the high PN group, and a '0' if the PNs are from the low PN group. During
regeneration, the stop point flags (represented as a bitstring) are consulted to determine
when bit generation occurs. Therefore, the bitstring of stop point flags represents
additional helper data.
7.3.2. DPNC Example
An example of the DPNC process is shown in Fig. 11. The modulus is set to M=22,
and the range of valid PNs accepted in the low PN bin are given by {4,5,6}, while the
valid PNs for the high PN bin are defined as {15,16,17}. The value of counter k is set to
5. This example first depicts the enrollment process, in which PNs are read from the on-
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Fig. 11: Dual-PN/Count Example
chip memory, left to right, as shown in the top of the figure. Also shown are the states of
the counters after each PN is read. When the high PN counter reaches 5 (as shown in the
circle), a '1' bit is generated and added to the bitstring (not shown), and a '1' is written to
the current location in the Stop Point Memory. At this point, both counters are cleared
and the process continues until a second bit (a '0' in this case) is generated. The bitstring
is built up in this fashion one bit at a time, until a user-specified number is reached.
The bottom portion of Fig. 11 illustrates the process carried out during
regeneration. Here, the '1' bits in the Valid Path Memory (not shown) indicate which
paths were used for bit generation during enrollment, and dictate now those paths that
must be re-tested for proper regeneration. Similarly, the '1' bits in Stop Point Memory (in
Fig. 11) force bits to be generated at these points (the counters are not consulted). The
counters, however, are consulted to determine the value of the generated bit, which is
determined by the larger of the two counter values. In the example, two of the five values
that were in the high PN bin during enrollment have 'flipped' and now appear in the low
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PN bin (see elements highlighted with the heavy borders).
However, because the majority, 3 out of 5, are high PNs, the algorithm correctly
regenerates a '1' bit despite the presence of the erroneous measurements. Also note that
the first erroneous measurement (the '8' in the heavy border) is of no consequence since it
is not part of the consecutive sequence of 5 PNs that are consulted to determine the value
of the bit (these 5 PNs are identified in the figure with a curly bracket).
This seemingly innocuous observation constitutes a major strength of this
technique. The initial intent of the DPNC algorithm called for simply incrementing the
counter associated with the current PN and monitoring the difference between the two
counters, generating a bit as soon as a difference of k was reached. The logic behind this
approach was that a difference of k would occur much more frequently than a sequence of
k would in a given sequence of PNs, resulting in less unused PNs and, as a result, greater
efficiency and reduced running time for the algorithm. However, an analysis of the two
approaches showed that this method resulted in only a 33% increase in efficiency, while
incurring 9.95 times as many errors as the technique which requires k common-group
values in a sequence. This analysis was the basis for the decision to implement the latter
technique for DPNC.

7.4. Universal/No-Modulus Bit Generation Technique
In [27], we developed a method called “Universal-No Modulus” (UNM) that is
capable of generating O(n2) bits from n PNs. UNM avoids bit flips by using only the
longest and shortest paths in the MUT for comparisons, discarding paths of medium
length. It avoids the bias that would normally result under these conditions by exploiting
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the property that path stability is random across chips. In other words, even though the
result of comparing a short path with a long path is predictable from the design, the
stability, and therefore selection, of short and long paths is random from chip to chip.
Figs. 12(a) and 12(b) show the path distribution from a typical chip, with the PN
range plotted along the x-axis against ‘number of instances’ along the y-axis. During
enrollment (Fig. 12(a)), UNM uses two thresholds to partition the distribution into 3
regions. The tail regions on the left and right are considered valid PN regions. PNs in the
tails represent short (Low PNs) and long (High PNs) paths respectively. The large
‘invalid’ region between the thresholds, given as 32 and 90 in Fig. 12(a), is a safety zone
between the groups designed to prevent ‘jumps’, and bit flips, between the Low and High
PN regions. The placement of the thresholds determines the balance between the number
of paths in each tail region, and are established using a process that characterizes the
path-length distribution at the start of each enrollment. Jumps, although infrequent, can
occur because of the appearance and disappearance of hazards (glitches) on side-inputs of
gates along the tested paths. Small temperature variations or power supply noise
influence the behavior of these hazards, in which changes in the delays of difference
branch paths are affected nonuniformly. Examples of tolerable (green line) and
intolerable (red line) jumps are shown Fig. 12, wherein the lines indicate PNs that were
significantly higher during regeneration than they were during enrollment.
The safety zone is only enforced during enrollment, and is redefined as the
midpoint between the margins during regeneration as shown in Fig. 12(b). The DCE
process creates a valid path bitstring during enrollment so the same sequence of path tests
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can be carried out during regeneration. In our experiments, we found that UNM generates
a valid PN after approx. every 20 tested paths, depending on the user-specified width of
the 'invalid' region. The “XOR-style” bit generation process is carried out by comparing
pairs of PNs, where PNs from the same region generate a '0', while those from opposite
regions generate a ‘1’. With n PNs, up to n*(n-1)/2 bits can be generated by considering
all combinations.
7.4.1. Weakness of the Universal/No-Modulus Method
The Universal/No-Modulus bit generation method is robust in the presence of
jumps that do not exceed at least one-half the size of the safety gap. However, the net

Fig. 12: Universal/No-Modulus Bit Generation Technique
effect of imposing this large gap in the allowable PNs during enrollment is a dramatic
reduction in the number of stable paths that can be used for bit generation. This creates
three effects, all of which adversely affect the utility of this technique. First, the
efficiency, in terms of the number of paths that must be tested for a given bitstring length
and the running time of the algorithm, is severely limited. Additionally, the size of the
public storage requirement increases in direct proportion to the increased demand for
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paths tested. Finally, the amount of excess entropy for a given macro-under-test is
reduced, increasing the probability that a reduction in performance against standardized
randomness testing will occur.

7.5. Universal/No-Modulus Difference (UNMD) Bit Generation
In response to these weaknesses in the UNM bit generation technique, in [28], we
presented the HELP PUF and a bit generation technique called Universal/No-Modulus
(UNM). We investigate a variant of this UNM technique in this section. Unlike the
DPNC described above, UNM leverages the randomness associated with the stability of
paths across chips and, as a result, there is no need to consider bias, i.e., UNM can
compare short paths with long paths directly without first reducing the overall path length
of the PNs, as is true for DPNC. The technique described in [27] defines a low and a high
PN bin (similar to DPNC), but with the bins defined in this case over the entire path
distribution range from 0 to 128. A large margin of approx. 100 is created between the
bins to allow for shifts and jumps in the PNs during regeneration. The original technique
therefore discards a large fraction of PNs that fall within this margin during enrollment
(beyond those discarded because of path stability problems as described in Chapter 4).
We refer to the variant described here as 'UNM Difference' or UNMD. In UNMD,
we replace the fixed margin with the concept of a noise threshold, discussed below. By
doing so, UNMD does not discard stable PNs as is true of UNM, but rather preserves and
makes use of all PNs generated by the DCE. This feature reduces the workload imposed
on the DCE to find a suitable set of PNs that meet a bitstring target by 95.8% when
compared with the original fixed threshold technique. As we will show, UNMD offers
49

significant advantages in both running time and memory
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PNs to compare and the values are read from on-chip memory
into a pair of registers (PN 'A' and PN 'B'). PN 'B' is then subtracted from PN 'A' to
produce a PN difference. The magnitude of the difference determines the strength of that
pairing, as discussed in the next section. If that difference is sufficiently large, then the
sign of the comparison determines the value of the generated bit. A negative sign
produces a '0', and a positive sign produces a '1'.

7.6. Thresholding Technique
A thresholding technique similar to that proposed in [29] is used to decide if a
given comparison generates a strong bit (which is kept) or a weak bit (which is
discarded). Thresholding works as follows. During enrollment, a noise threshold is
defined using the path distribution histogram for the chip. The histogram is constructed
using all n PNs collected by the DC engine. The noise threshold is then computed as a
constant that is proportional to the difference between the PNs at the 5 and 95 percentiles
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in this distribution. Therefore, each chip uses a different threshold that is 'tuned' to that
chip's overall (chip-to-chip) delay variation profile.
For each comparison, the difference between the two PNs is compared against the
noise threshold. A strong bit is generated if the magnitude of the difference exceeds the
threshold, otherwise the bit is discarded. Simultaneously, a bit is added to the 'Strong Bit
Memory' shown in Fig. 13 that reflects the status of the comparison, with a '1' indicating
a strong bit and a '0' indicating a weak bit. During regeneration, the Strong Bit Memory is
consulted to determine which comparisons are used to regenerate the bitstring.
Fig. 14 shows the path distribution for a typical chip. The dashed lines indicate the
5 and 95 percentiles, with PNs of 23 and 117 respectively. The difference between these
PNs is multiplied by a noise margin (0.90 in this example) to compute a noise threshold
of 84.6. Pairings which differ by more than this threshold form 'strong' bits, while
pairings that differ by less than this threshold are deemed to be 'weak' and will be
discarded. The 'pairings' in Fig. 14 illustrate this concept.
PN Difference: 117-23=94
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Fig. 14: Illustration – UNMD Technique
7.7. TMR-Based Error Correction Scheme
In Chapter 8, a detrimental behavior referred to as “jumping” is described as a
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worst-case condition and these discontinuous jumps represent our biggest challenge in
dealing with bit flips. Both DPNC and UNMD are adversely impacted by jumps. In our
experiments, some path delays changed because of jumps by as much as 4.5 ns, or 58
PNs, at different TV corners. Moreover, the PN differences computed by UNMD
exacerbate the problem, where jumps in two path delays can combine in a worse-thanworst-case fashion.
This is illustrated in the graphs of Fig. 15, which depict data from one of the VirtexII boards. The graphs plot the 'strong bit' number along the x-axis against the PN
differences on the y-axis, with the noise thresholds (as described above) set to ±77.4 for
this Virtex-II board. The data points from enrollment on the left all fall above or below
these thresholds (by definition), but data points from measurements taken at different TV

Fig. 15: Effect of Thresholding Technique on Reliability
corners in the graph on the right 'infringe' into the space between the thresholds. Most
data points remain close to the thresholds, but some move significantly (because of
jumps), as highlighted, by as much as 5.6 ns or 71 PNs.
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By choosing a conservative noise threshold, bit flips caused by jumps such as those
shown in Fig. 15(b) can be avoided. However, a different strategy is needed in cases
where the application requires the probability of a bit-flip to be negligibly small (e.g.,
encryption). We proposed a technique in [28] that is based on a popular fault tolerant
technique called triple modular redundancy (TMR), which is capable of reducing the
probability of failure to values below 1e-11. The method constructs 3 copies of the
bitstring (using the abundance of bits provided by the PUF) and uses majority voting to
construct the final bitstring. The probability of a bit-flip error is significantly reduced
because any single bit-flip that occurs in any column of bits defined by the 3 copies can
be tolerated. Probability of failure is investigated in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 8: Reliability Enhancement Techniques
Throughout the course of the experimental work with the HELP PUF, two
persistently troublesome issues have emerged as the primary sources of the errors in our
bitstring generation techniques.
The first is the change in path delay that is caused by one or more changing
environmental conditions, primarily in supply voltage and operating temperature. The
impacts of these changes on the propagation delay through a given path are consistent
with the drain current equations for the complementary MOSFET devices that comprise
the gates along the path, and are therefore somewhat predictable and consistent.
The second source of errors, and the least easily predicted or mitigated, are
characterized by discontinuous “jumps” that can cause the delay for a given path to
change in abrupt, often large amounts of as much as 4 ns to 5 ns.
A third, less problematic error mechanism consists of the subtle differences in the
distributions of the path lengths across the range of paths measured for each individual
chip. These differences manifest themselves in two distinct modes: the first mode is a
apparently random, normal distribution of mean path values throughout the population of
boards, and the second mode is marked by a distinct shift in the means of two speed
grades (-6, -7) for the devices mounted on the two boards.
To correct for these sources of errors in the PN measurements, the following
reliability enhancement techniques were devised and implemented in hardware: a
temperature/voltage compensation technique (TVCOMP) for addressing the changes in
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Fig. 16: Jump Behavior vs. Path Length
environmental conditions and a path distribution characterization technique (PDIST) for
addressing the differences in path length distribution between devices. Unfortunately, the
“jump” behavior described earlier, and depicted in Fig. 16, has been found to be too
inconsistent and too unpredictable to be solved using the types of broadly applied
corrective measures described here. The only techniques that have been shown to be
effective against these jumps are the error-tolerance features included in the bit
generation techniques in the previous chapter.

8.1. Temperature/Voltage Compensation (TVCOMP)
To adjust for the measurable changes in path length that are caused by changing
voltages and temperatures occurring between enrollment and regeneration, a technique
was developed that establishes a mean path length for a small subset of paths that are
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deemed to be stable during an enrollment. We then compute the total path lengths of the
same set of paths during regeneration, and adjust each of the subsequent path
measurements to accommodate this shift in mean path delay.
To implement this feature, we maintain two registers during enrollment (a path
counter and a path delay accumulator). For each of the first 64 valid, stable paths, that
path length is added to the accumulator and the counter is incremented. After 64 paths
have been added to the counter, the counter is divided by 64, using a rightward shift of 6
bits (26=64). This value is transferred into a register to use as a “mean enrollment
reference delay”, and the enrollment process continues normally.
During regeneration, the same technique is performed: the first 64 path delays are
accumulated and the result is divided by 64 to determine the “mean regeneration delay”.
At this point, the difference between the mean delay values at enrollment and
regeneration is computed, and the Data Collection Engine restarts the regeneration,
applying the difference to the regenerated path delay values. Following this adjustment,
each of the path delays measured during regeneration are shifted back into alignment
with the path delays measured during enrollment.
In implementing this technique, two approximations were made and merit
discussion here. The first approximation is that all paths are equally affected by the
changing environmental conditions. In fact, this is not the case; consistent with the drain
current equations for MOSFET devices, the path length change, Δt, is a function of the
overall path delay, so that Δt tends to be greater for long paths and less for short paths.
However, because the 64 paths that are sampled are drawn without bias from the chip's
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path distribution, this approximation has some merit and represents a reasonable trade-off
between accuracy and hardware efficiency and simplicity.
The second approximation that is made concerns the stability of the environmental
conditions during the Data Collection Engine operation. This algorithm is implemented
only at the beginning of the data collection process. As a result, additional changes in the
operating conditions the occur during the data collection process will degrade the
effectiveness of the TVCOMP process. Experiments performed with different lengths of
temperature soak times (the time after a new temperature point was reached and held
before a new operation was started) clearly showed that thermal changes propagating
through the device during the data collection process, whether during enrollment or
regeneration, adversely impacted the effectiveness of the technique.

8.2. Path Distribution (PDIST) Characterization
The bit generation techniques presented in the previous chapter rely on some
degree of freedom from structural bias in the underlying data (the PNs stored in PN
memory). One potential source of bias is an incorrect assumption about the likelihood of
some numbers occurring more frequently than others. This condition can occur for
several reasons, but the primary cause is a difference in the distribution of paths lengths
being measured from one chip to the next.
Path length distribution (hereafter referred to as “path distribution”) in the MUT for
a given chip was found to follow a generally Gaussian distribution around a mean path
length of 11 ns to 12 ns. Furthermore, the distributions of the mean path lengths of each
of the chips for each of two speed grades also was normally distributed around a
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population mean for that speed grade. Slower chips (identified on the package with a
speed grade of -6) tend to have a mean path length of 10.70 ns while faster chips (speed
grade -7) have a mean path length of 9.93 ns. The graphic in Fig.17 provides a succinct
depiction of the path length distributions in our set of boards through the use of box plots
which capture the mean, minimum, maximum, and 25th and 75th percentiles of the
distribution. As shown, the boards are divided into two sets (“Slow”/“Fast” indicates a
speed grade of (-6/-7), respectively).
The PDIST algorithm is a process that, when requested via a user parameter, is
invoked at the start of an enrollment operation that uses either UNM or UNMD as the bit
generation algorithm. It runs immediately following the TVCOMP algorithm, and
collects the path lengths of 1,024 random paths in the distribution. A finite state machine
then sorts the results using a histogram-based sorting algorithm and identifies the PUF

Fig. 17: Distributions of Path Lengths across FPGA Boards
numbers associated with the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the distribution.

This

mechanism allows a finite state machine within the data collection engine, called the
LC_Test, to dynamically adjust the parameters of the data collection engine so that the
same number of paths exist at the low and high ends of the range, resulting in a more
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balanced distribution of PUF numbers from each end of the path length spectrum. This
dynamic balancing is required to prevent bias in the data from adversely impacting the
randomness performance of the HELP PUF.
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Chapter 9: Experimental Results and Analysis
To test the effectiveness of the HELP PUF, environmental experiments were carried
out on 30 Virtex-II Pro boards using a thermoelectric cooler (TEC) apparatus and a
programmable power supply. As indicated earlier, each board was tested at 9 TV corners,
defined by all combinations of three temperatures (0°C, 25°C and 70°C) and three
voltages (1.35V, 1.50V and 1.65V). Data collected at 25°C and 1.50V is treated as
enrollment data while the data collected at the remaining 8 TV corners is treated as
regeneration data.

9.1. Hamming Distance (HD)
Inter-chip Hamming Distance (HD) measures uniqueness of the bitstrings across
boards, and is computed by counting the number of bits that are different in the bitstrings
from each pairing of boards. An average inter-chip HD is computed using the results from
all possible pairings, which in our experiments is 30*29/2 = 435. The inter-chip HDs are
typically converted into percentages by dividing each of them by the length of the
bitstrings. The best achievable average HD under these conditions is 50%. Intra-chip HD,
on the other hand, is the number of bits that differ in two bitstrings obtained from the
same chip but tested under different environmental conditions. The ideal intra-chip HD is
zero, and a non-zero value indicates that one or more bit flips occurred during
regeneration. In our experiments, intra-chip HDs are computed across the 9 TV corners
for each board and then an average is computed using the 9*8/2 = 36 individual HDs.
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Fig. 18: Hamming Distance (HD) for UNM Method
The 'average-of-the-averages' is then computed using the average HDs from all boards.
Fig. 19 shows histograms for the inter-chip HDs and other statistical results obtained for
the DPNC and UNMD techniques.
9.1.1. UNM
Fig. 18 shows the HD distribution as well as the mean (Mn) and standard deviation
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Fig. 19: Hamming Distance (HD)
(SD) of the Gaussian curve fitted to, and superimposed on, the distribution. The interchip HD is 50.0019% for bitstrings with a length of 1,028,890. This is very close to the
ideal value of 50%. The standard deviation is also very small. Combined with a mean
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intra-chip HD of 2.74e-7, these results indicate the bitstrings are highly reliable and
unique.
9.1.2. DPNC
The length of the bitstrings using the DPNC technique is 256 bits. The average
inter-chip HD in Fig. 19(a) is 49.923%. A Gaussian curve is shown fitted on top of the
inter-chip HD distribution as a means of illustrating expected behavior. The standard
deviation of the normal curve is 8.192 (where smaller is better). This value is consistent
with the expected standard deviation of a normally distributed set of random values.
The average intra-chip HD is 0.038%. The non-zero value indicates that bit-flips
occurred with a frequency of 0.097 bit-flips per 256-bit string.
9.1.3. UNMD
The length of the bitstrings for the UNMD technique is 6,698,512. Fig. 19(b) plots
the inter-chip HD distribution. The average inter-chip HD is 50.001%. The intra-chip HD
using the bitstrings prior to applying is 4.59%, which became 0% after applying TMR.

9.2. NIST Statistical Analysis of Randomness
To test the randomness of the bitstrings produced by the HELP PUF, we used a
statistical test suite provided by the National Institute of Science and Technology, or
NIST [14]. These tests were applied to the bitstrings from the 30 boards.
9.2.1. UNM
The NIST statistical test suite is also applied to the bitstrings from the 29 boards.
The bitstrings pass all NIST statistical tests, with no more than 2 boards failing any of the
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15 tests. In addition, these bitstrings pass all of the P-value-of-the-P-values tests, even in
spite of the fact that the NIST documentation indicates that a minimum of 55 boards is
required before this metric can be considered valid.
9.2.2. DPNC
All of the bitstrings generated by this method passed each of the tests in the subset
of NIST tests that are applicable to 256-bit strings.
UNMD. The bit sequences generated by the UNMD method were sufficiently long
that all 15 NIST tests are applicable. All 15 tests passing, with no fewer than 28 boards
passing any one test (the number required by NIST for a test to be considered 'passed').

9.3. Analysis of Running Time
9.3.1. UNM
On average, the number of valid paths tested per second is 30.20 for enrollment and
88.03 for regeneration. This includes the time required to test and discard invalid paths,
and the time required to generate the n(n-1)/2 bitstrings from the n PNs stored in block
RAM.
9.3.2. DPNC
Bitstring generation times for HELP are reported here as the average number of bits
generated per minute, excluding serial data transfer time. During enrollment, the time
required to generate each bit depends on several factors, including the percentage of
tested paths that are stable, the value of k (the number of consecutive copies of a value
required to produce a bit), and the number of PNs that are read from memory before
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encountering k consecutive copies.
With k=5, the average number of paths tested for each generated bit during
enrollment is 1,261, due to the highly selective nature of the DPN binning algorithm
described previously. Bits are generated at an average rate of 36.4 bits per minute. During
regeneration, since only valid paths are measured, the average bit generation rate
increases to 167 bits per minute.
9.3.3. UNMD
On average, the data collection engine tested 3.92 paths for each of the 4,096 valid
PNs that we collected across 30 boards. On average, 22.35 paths were tested, at up to 12
samples per path, for stability every second. For the UNMD analysis, the PNs were
collected by the HELP PUF engine, while the bit generation process was completed offchip using a software program. This was done to allow us to evaluate a range of noise
thresholds without needing to re-collect the PNs each time. As a result, the FPGA running
time of the bit generation process for UNMD is not known.

9.4. Probability of Failure: Results and Analysis
9.4.1. UNM
As discussed above, a bit flip occurs when a PN measured during regeneration
jumps across the “bit flip line” as shown by the example in Fig. 4(b). The number of bit
flips that occurred across the 8 regenerations for the 29 boards is 10. This yields a
probability of failure of 8e-5, computed as 10 / (29 boards x 4096 PNs per board).
Although beyond the scope of this work, we have developed a simple, very low-overhead
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technique that eliminates all bit flips in our results and improves the probability of failure
to 7.25e-11.
9.4.2. DPNC
There were a total of 9 unique errors that resulted in 19 bit flips during the 240
regenerations that were performed during our experimentation. The overall single-bit
probability of failure (POF) is 3.09x10-4 (19 errors per (30 boards * 8 regenerations per
board * 256 bits per regeneration)). 16 of these 19 bit flips occur when the core logic
voltage of the FPGA is 10% lower than nominal.
9.4.3. UNMD
The probability-of-failure analysis for the UNMD method is performed as two
analyses: the POF for the initial bitstring and the POF for the TMR-based bitstring
described in Chapter 7. Both of these analyses involve generating bitstrings at all 9 TV
corners across a range of noise thresholds. In each case, we record the number of bit flips
that occur at each noise threshold, and then fit an exponential curve to this data. The
exponential fit allows us to model expected error rates for noise thresholds far higher than
those at which bit flips actually occur in our empirical results.
For the initial bitstrings, we computed a theoretical error rate of 1.54 x 10-6, or 1 bit
flip in approx. 650,000 bits generated. Fig. 20(a) illustrates the actual and theoretical
error rates for each of the TMR-based bitstrings. Fig. 20(b) shows an enlarged view of the
theoretical error rate at a noise margin of 0.90. At this noise threshold, our POF is 1.096
x 10-11, or 1 bit flip in approx. 91 billion bits generated.
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Fig. 20: Probability of Failure (UNMD)
9.5. UNMD Security Vulnerability and Mitigation.
The HELP PUF, when using the UNMD method, is capable of generating reliable,
cryptographic-strength bitstrings of up to several million bits in length. However, an
adversary with access to the simulation model of the target system may be able to
“reverse engineer” the secret bitstring. While this vulnerability would be difficult to
exploit, the only way to completely eliminate the threat is to obfuscate the Valid Path
Memory component of the public data.
Since the DPNC method is not subject to this vulnerability, we propose to use
DPNC to generate a small (32- to 64-bit) bitstring that can be used to obscure the public
data produced by the UNMD technique using the same set of PNs during the enrollment
process. The public data for this short bit string is added to the obfuscated UNMD public
data. At the start of regeneration, the unobscured public data for the DPNC method is
used to regenerate the short bitstring, which is then used to unveil the public data for the
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UNMD regeneration process.
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Chapter 10: Future Work

The FPGA implementation of the HELP PUF has been highly successful in
demonstrating the concept of the PUF and studying its performance. The PUF has been
shown to perform well against the three fundamental criteria for PUF performance that
were set out in the introduction: uniqueness (inter-chip HD), robustness (intra-chip HD),
and randomness (NIST). Additionally, through the use of the TMR-styled bitstring
replication method explained in Sect. 7.7, we have been able to reduce the probability of
an error in a 256-bit bitstring to approximately 3 parts per billion.
In this chapter, I present a discussion of additional work that will be of value to
increasing the attractiveness of, and/or enhancing our understanding of, the HELP PUF.

10.1. ASIC Implementation
Perhaps the most obvious extension of this work is to port an improved version of
the HELP PUF's design into an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) platform. At
the time of this writing, this work is already underway, and a design is being prepared for
inclusion on a test chip that will be fabricated in a 130-nm bulk technology. This
implementation is expected to be completed in the Fall of 2013.
Challenges posed by an ASIC implementation will include the necessity of
designing the required clocking resources, replacing the proven digital clock managers
(DCMs) that are available on the Xilinx Virtex2-Pro FPGA. In particular, the ability to
control the phase relationship between a DCM output and a reference clock must be
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preserved. The critical role that this adjustment plays in both the operation of the PUF
and its performance means that this design goal will require careful analog-level
simulation of phase controllability using a post-layout netlist.

10.2. Aging: A Study of the PUF Performance Over Time
The reliability of the HELP PUF is directly related to the relationships between
path delays of different paths in the MUT. Therefore, anything that causes those path
delays to change presents a risk to the PUF's ability to correctly regenerate a bitstring.
And, while we have thus far treated the variations upon which the PUF relies for its
operation as being static and unchanging after the point of manufacture, this assumption
may not be valid when the effects of aging are considered.
Aging effects for path delay include anything that affects the rate of charging and
discharging the parasitic on-path and off-path capacitances. For transistors, changes to
threshold voltages, effective resistance, and charge carrier mobility caused by hot carrier
injection (HCI) and negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) are a primary concern,
while electromigration in the metal lines of the interconnections can also impact the
resistances through which these currents are supplied.
The specific concerns surrounding aging effects on the HELP PUF differ slightly
depending upon the bit generation method that is invoked.

For UNM/UNMD, the

bitstring that is generated depends on the relative differences in delay between paths, so
that the sensitivity of these methods to common-mode changes (changes that affect all
paths equally) will have a less detrimental effect than localized changes in individual path
delays. DPNC, however, considers each of the PN values individually, and is therefore
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more likely to suffer from any changes to path delay that cause mod-PNs to change from
one group to another.
At present, we do not have any specific data that directly correlates the same path
delay measurements separated only by significant amounts of time. The evolving nature
of the HELP PUF's structure and operation means that the data that was collected in the
early experiments is not directly comparable to the data collected more recently. This is
due to the lack of control over the actual placement and routing of each of the different
versions of the HELP PUF engine bitstream. As new features were added and changes
made to the implementation, each generated bitstream resulted in the use of different
primitives and routing resources on the FPGA, and therefore path delays for the same
path (comprised of an initial and final launch vector and a target insertion point) no
longer bore any relevance.
An accelerated aging test regimen on all or part of the population of test boards is
not a desirable option. The XUP boards that we have used for this experimentation
represent a sizable investment and are a valuable resource for other experimentation. As
a result, any testing that risks permanent damage to the boards is not suitable under the
circumstances. However, specific repetition of tests using the same bitstreams that were
used in the early phase of HELP PUF experimentation could be performed solely for the
purpose of determining the impact of aging on the HELP PUF's performance.

10.3. The Use of Voltage Scaling to Improve Reliability
Our environmental testing revealed a strong correlation between the worst
reliability performance and low supply voltage. Sixteen out of nineteen bit flips that
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occurred during testing of the DPNC method occurred when the supply voltage was set to
1.35V (10% below the normal VCC).
One idea that offers a measure of protection against this error-producing condition
is to perform an additional filtering step during enrollment to eliminate paths that are
susceptible to jumping at lower-than-normal supply voltages. The use of voltage scaling
circuits to reduce the supply voltage on an ASIC could allow paths to be measured at both
nominal and low voltages, and if significant changes occur between the path lengths
under these conditions, the path could be marked as invalid in PN memory and the
possible error averted.
Voltage scaling circuits were originally introduced to match power consumption
and applications' performance requirements in computing hardware designed for mobile
applications. Static voltage scaling technologies such as Intel's SpeedStep are used to
match power and performance requirements on a per-application level, while true
dynamic voltage scaling techniques (such as Marvell's Xscale processor technology)
involves “on-the-fly” changes to operating voltage and processor frequency based upon
continuously changing operating environments[30]. It is anticipated that either approach
would be appropriate for this application.
Much of the research work required to explore this option could be done using
existing hardware, and a sense of the effectiveness of voltage scaling on the reliability of
HELP could possibly be obtained from existing data from our TV experiments. The same
is true for the ASIC version; it is not strictly necessary to incorporate voltage scaling
hardware into the on-chip design, since the entire chip's supply voltage may be adjusted
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externally. Regarding the inclusion of voltage scaling circuitry on the test chip currently
being design, several questions emerge. These questions include whether the scaling
circuitry could be built simply from the standard cell library currently being developed
for the next test chip, how costly the circuit would be in terms of area, power, and design
complexity, and whether its inclusion in the design would adversely impact the other
primitives on the ASIC.

10.4. Attack Threat Analysis and Mitigation
An important topic in any PUF research is the threat of adversarial attacks designed
to steal secret data from a PUF. Side-channel attacks are aimed at extracting information
from one of a number of secondary sources, such as global chip current, power
consumption, electromagnetic emissions, or optically observing the circuit's behavior
through the use of such techniques as backside thinning. More invasive attacks, such as
probing attacks, attempt to learn the key through more direct physical access.
Another type of side-channel attack is the fault injection attack. This is considered
an active attack because it involves the creation of one or more fault conditions, which
might include abnormal power supply levels, out-of-spec clock timing, or invalid timing
conditions (i.e., setup-hold violations). By recording the resulting output of the PUF, it is
possible to gain critical information about the internal state of the device.[31]
Another form of attack is the modeling attack, wherein an attacker repeatedly
applies challenges and records the corresponding responses in order to build a linear
model of the variations in the system, and in so doing can learn the secret data or
significantly reduce the size of the problem to the point at which a brute force attack is
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feasible.
Of these, perhaps the greatest threat of attacks on the HELP PUF are power
analysis attacks. In particular, it would be prudent to study the effectiveness of
differential power analysis (DPA) attacks, in which repeated power traces are captured on
an oscilloscope and analyzed using statistical methods to identify power signatures
associated with certain states, values, or conditions within the chip. No specific attempts
have been made thus far to assess the vulnerability of HELP to DPA attacks. Additionally,
no hardware features have been added to HELP to obfuscate the power behavior of
critical operations that may leak the internal states of the engine. Both of these represent
opportunities for improving the viability of the HELP PUF.
The HELP PUF may prove to be more resilient to model-building attacks, since the
specific MUT does not present an adversary with a simple, repeating set of gates to
model, in the way that Arbiter PUFs and RO-PUFs do. However, the work that we have
been doing has heretofore been confined to ensuring that the PUF performs well in terms
of the specific PUF metrics, and a complete attack threat analysis has been outside of the
scope of that work.
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Chapter 11: Conclusion
In this dissertation, details have been presented regarding the design and
experimental testing of HELP, a practical, realizable PUF, and several bit generation
techniques have been proposed and their strengths and weaknesses analyzed. In
particular, two of these bit generation techniques, called DPNC and UNMD, have been
put forward as showing the most robustness, reliability, and utility. The HELP PUF is
based on variations in path delays and on the stability of those paths, each measured from
a core logic macro embedded within the chip. The results of the HD, NIST, and POF
analyses show the bitstrings to be genuinely random, unique, and highly reproducible
under changing environmental conditions, all of which are critical requirements for the
potential use of HELP in applications such as mobile computing or smartcards.
Finally, a list of additional research work was included that, if completed, will
strengthen the viability of the HELP PUF as a cryptographic-strength hardware security
primitive.
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